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Earlier single-country studies found a higher level of intrinsic motivation among public sector 
workers, compared to the private sector. Using data from the World Values Survey, covering 51 
countries, we find a tendency for public sector workers to be more intrinsically motivated, but this is 
not a universal relationship: we also show that the level of government corruption (appropriately 
instrumented) explains some of the variation across countries. Consistent with earlier studies that 
find that selection accounts for differential motivation across sectors, we show that intrinsically-
motivated workers are less likely to work in the public sector when corruption is higher.  
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1.  Introduction 
There is a growing theoretical and empirical literature that emphasizes the importance of intrinsic 
– or pro-social – motivation among public sector workers. Using different indicators, a number 
of studies have found evidence to support the idea that public sector workers are more pro-
socially motivated than private, for-profit workers. For example, public sector workers self-
report a higher level of intrinsic motivation than private sector workers (Perry 1996, Houston 
2000). They are more likely to vote in elections and to engage with civic groups (Brewer 2003) 
and to report charitable donations of time, blood and money (Houston 2006). Gregg et al (2011) 
also found evidence of pro-social behaviour in relation to their main employment – workers in 
non-profit organisations are more likely to donate labour, measured by whether or not they do 
unpaid overtime.  
Previous empirical studies looking at intrinsic motivation among public sector workers have 
tended to focus on individual countries. In this paper we use data from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) to compare the characteristics of public and private sector workers, including their 
intrinsic motivation, across 51 countries that cover a range of income levels, political regimes and 
cultures. We show that there is a strong tendency for public sector workers to be more 
intrinsically motivated than private sector workers in many countries, but that this is not a 
universal relationship. Indeed, there are many countries where public sector workers are less pro-
socially motivated than private sector workers.    
The main contribution of this paper is to explore whether differences in corruption across 
countries can explain (some of) the variation in intrinsic motivation among public sector 
workers. A number of papers have emphasized that worker selection plays an important role in 
explaining how pro-socially motivated workers come to be in the public sector, either because 
they are attracted by the mission of the sector  (Dixit, 2002, Besley and Ghatak, 2005) or because 2 
 
the sector provides an opportunity for workers to signal their intrinsic motivation (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2007, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2007, 2009) and there is empirical evidence to support this 
selection mechanism (Steijn, 2008, Gregg et al 2011). It seems likely that intrinsically motivated 
workers would be less attracted to work in a corrupt administration either because they would be 
less likely to share a corrupt organisation’s mission or alternatively because working in the public 
sector would no longer provide a signal of their intrinsic motivation. Discussing the case of 
healthcare in Ethiopia, for example, Serra, Sernels and Barr (2011) argue that pro-social health 
professionals choose not to work in the corrupt public sector. We generalize this and look at 
whether differences in the level of corruption across countries are associated with differences in 
the degree of pro-sociality among public sector workers. We show that corruption, appropriately 
instrumented, has a negative effect on the degree of intrinsic motivation among public sector 
workers. We also find that pro-socially motivated workers are less likely to work in the public 
sector when levels of corruption are higher.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the World Values Survey and the 
main variables used. Section 3 compares characteristics of public and private sector workers 
while section 4 looks at the relationship between the level of intrinsic motivation and corruption. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2.  The World Values Survey 
We analyse data from wave five of the World Values Survey, carried out over the period 1
st April 
2005 – 31
st December 2006. Our sample consists of 59,604 respondents from 51 countries, 
representing a total population of 4.8 billion (73.3 per cent of the world population)
1
                                                           




Information on the sample sizes for each country, which range between 668 and 2,697, is given 
in Table 1.  
Sector of employment 
The latest wave of the survey for the first time collected information on sector of employment – 
either for current employment or for previous “major work”. We focus only on current 
employees in line with the approach taken in most previous studies.  
Specifically, the question asks the following:  
Are you working for the government or public institution, for private business or industry, or for a private 
non-profit organization? Do you or did you work for: 
1 Government or public institution 
2 Private business or industry 
3 Private non-profit organization 
The proportions who report working in each sector are shown in Table 1, together with an 
external benchmark of employment in the public sector, which we take from the International 
Labour Organisation (Labour Statistics Database, 2006). Ideally, we would like separately to 
analyze employment in the not-for-profit sector but the sample sizes for most countries are too 
small to do this in a meaningful way. Our focus is therefore on workers in the public sector and 
the private, for-profit sector.  
There is some suggestion that the WVS under-estimates the proportion that works in the public 
sector compared to the ILO figures, but public sector size measured in the WVS is positively and 4 
 
significantly correlated with the external benchmark
2
<< Figure 1 neare here>>  
 (the correlation coefficient is 0.337). Figure 
1 shows this more clearly. 
Intrinsic motivation 
The World Values Survey contains a number of indicators of intrinsic motivation. The main one 
we use captures individuals’ work motivation:  
Regardless of whether you're actually looking for a job, which one would you, personally, place first if you 
were looking for a job: 
1 A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 
2 A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 
3 Working with people you like 
4 Doing an important job that gives you a feeling of accomplishment 
We interpret the response, “doing an important job”, as an indicator of intrinsic motivation. 
                                                           
2 In this paper unless otherwise stated we define WVS public sector employment as those who 
responded that they currently work for ‘Government or a public institution.’ However, when 
comparing the relative size of the public sector in the WVS with the ILO measure of the public 
sector, we also include NFP workers in the WVS definition of the public sector. This is because 
the public sector in the ILO database is defined as all market or non market activities which at 
each institutional level are controlled and mainly financed by a public authority. This therefore 
includes non-market Non Profit Institutions (NPIs) that are controlled and financed by a public 
body. http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSMe.html. 5 
 
As well as work motivation, we also look at individuals’ broader self-perception of themselves 
with a second indicator based on questions that ask respondents about what things are important 
to them in life:  
Now I will briefly describe some people. Would you please indicate for each whether that person is very 
much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? 
It is important to this person to help the people nearby, to care for their wellbeing.
3
We define people as being pro-socially motivated if they respond that this person is “very much 
like them” or “like them”. To control for person-specific response bias we also condition on 
people who respond negatively to being rich and having a lot of money.  
  
As a final indicator, we also look at individuals’ self-reported activity in organisations that might 
be considered pro-social, including charity, and environmental organisations.  
3.  Comparison of public and private sector workers 
Table 2 summarizes for each country in our sample the proportions of public and private sector 
workers who we would define as intrinsically motivated according to the three different 
indicators. The raw data show a clear tendency for workers in the public sector to be more pro-
socially motivated than workers in the private sector, but this is not universal. Looking at work 
motivation, for example, there are a number of countries, including Mali, South Korea, Bulgaria 
and Spain, where private sector workers have a higher level of intrinsic motivation.    
To examine the relationship further and to control for other differential characteristics of public 
sector workers we run regressions of the following form for each of the 51 countries in the 
World Values Survey for which we have information:
4
                                                           
3 Another potential indicator of pro-sociality is individuals who agree that it is important to this 
person to look after the environment. This yields very similar results.  
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i i i i u X M Pub + + + = γ β β 1 0  
Where Pubi is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the individual works in the public sector 
(equal to zero if the individual works in the private sector) and Mi is an indicator of intrinsic 
motivation (each indicator is included separately). Xi
Coefficients from the 51 regressions are reported in Table 3. There are clear differences in the 
demographic characteristics of public and private sector workers. There is a near-universal 
tendency for public sector workers to be older, to be more likely to be female and to be better 
educated than private sector workers. In 44 out of 51 countries, age has a positive effect on the 
probability of working in the public sector (this is statistically significant for 31). In 44 countries, 
being female has a positive effect (statistically significant for 28) and in all but one country, 
having a degree has a positive effect (statistically significant for 45). When we control for some 
of the difference in job types between the two sectors by looking only at non-manual workers, 
the results are qualitatively similar although there is less statistical significance because of the 
smaller sample sizes.
 is a vector of control variables, including 
age, gender and education level. We estimate these regressions using a linear probability model 
which makes it easier to interpret the coefficients – the results from running a probit model are 
very similar.  
5
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 This approach is very similar to Aknin et al (2010) who look at the relationship between giving 
to charity and subjective well-being across a large number of different countries. In the WVS we 
also find that people with higher levels of subjective well-being are also more likely to work in 
the public sector (positive for 41 out of 51 and statistically significant for 18).    
  
5 The survey does not have any information on occupations that would allow us to control 
further for differences in job types.  7 
 
The regression results confirm the findings from the raw data of the strong tendency for public 
sector workers to have a higher level of intrinsic motivation than private sector workers, but that 
this is not a universal relationship. For 30 (out of 51) countries workers reporting that their 
primary motivation is doing an important job are more likely to work in the public sector 
(statistically significant for 6). However, there are 21 countries for which the relationship runs in 
the other direction. When we include people whose second motivation is an important job 
(results not reported), the relationship appears slightly stronger – the coefficients are positive in 
38 countries (statistically significant for 16) – although again there are some countries for which 
the coefficients are negative.  
The results based on the life motivation variable are very similar. For 33 (out of 50) countries, 
people who think it is important to help others are more likely to work in the public sector 
(statistically significant for 10). Finally, those who are active in a charity/ environmental 
organisation are more likely to work in the public sector in 48 countries out of 51, statistically 
significant for 18. However, we find a qualitatively similar relationship (albeit weaker) for 
individuals who are active in a sports organisation, suggesting that the activity indicators may 
reflect other factors, such as time availability, as well as (or instead of) intrinsic motivation. 
4. Corruption and intrinsic motivation 
In this section we explore one possible explanation for variation in intrinsic motivation across 
countries, namely corruption. First, we show that, across countries, the level of government 
corruption has a negative effect on the degree of intrinsic motivation among public sector 
workers, exploiting a number of previously-used instruments for the level of corruption. 
Secondly, we present supporting evidence that intrinsically-motivated workers are less likely to 
work in the public sector in countries where the government is more corrupt.  
 8 
 
By way of motivation, Figure 2 clearly shows a negative relationship in the raw data between the 
level of intrinsic motivation among the public sector workforce in a country (measured by the 
difference between the public and private sector in the proportions of workers who cite their 
primary work motivation as doing an important job
6
<<Figure 2 near here>> 
) and how corrupt the country is perceived 
to be, measured by the corruption perception index (CPI). 
There are a number of possible explanations for this negative relationship. Perhaps most 
obviously, the more intrinsically motivated the workers in the public sector, the less likely they 
may be to engage in corrupt activities (accept bribes, embezzle public funds etc). Arguably since 
the measure of corruption is derived from people’s perceptions of the level of corruption, which 
may include their perception of the motivations of public sector workers, the two measures 
might actually capture the same thing.  
Another possibility is that both the level of corruption and the level of intrinsic motivation are 
jointly determined by other factors – such as wages. Ex ante, it is unclear which way the 
relationship would go. The literature suggests that higher wages are necessary to reduce the 
extent of corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weber, 2001), although high wages may then attract 
extrinsically motivated workers. We test the sensitivity of our results to wages below. 
Here, we are interested in the alternative direction of causation – that the level of corruption in a 
country may have an effect on the level of pro-social motivation among public sector workers. 
This idea is suggested by recent studies that have emphasized the role of selection in explaining 
why levels of pro-social motivation are higher in the public sector. A number of papers have 
argued that intrinsically-motivated individuals are likely to match with mission-oriented non-
                                                           
6 The relationship is strongest when we use this indicator, but other indicators yield qualitatively 
similar results.  9 
 
profit organisations, including the public sector (Dixit, 2002, and Besley and Ghatak, 2005). An 
alternative mechanism is that intrinsically-motivated individuals who also care about their 
reputation will choose to signal their altruism by working in the public sector (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2007, Delfgauuw and Dur, 2007, 2009). In the empirical literature Steijn (2008) and Gregg 
et al (2011) provide evidence of there being such a selection mechanism for the Netherlands and 
the UK, showing that high (low) PSM types tend to choose public (private) rather than private 
(public) sector work.  
The implicit assumption here is that intrinsically-motivated workers select into the public sector. 
But what if the government is corrupt? Intuitively, this would seem likely to make the public 
sector less attractive to pro-socially motivated individuals. Corruption would tend to undermine 
the public sector’s mission making it less attractive to people who are mission-oriented; also 
individuals would not be able signal their intrinsic motivation by choosing to work in a corrupt 
administration. Discussing the case of healthcare in Ethiopia, for example, Serra, Sernels and 
Barr (2011) argue that “the original mission of the public sector ... has been eroded by decades of 
central planning, weak monetary incentives and poor accountability”. They find evidence that 
pro-social and philanthropic health professionals choose not to work in the public sector (but 
instead choose the not-for-profit sector). In what follows we look at whether differences in the 
level of corruption across countries are associated with differences in the degree of pro-sociality 
among public sector workers. 
4.1 Variation across countries 
To test for a relationship between corruption and the degree of pro-social motivation among 
public sector workers, we estimate the following equation: 
c c c
PUB




c M is a measure of the level of intrinsic motivation among public sector workers in 
country c, measured by the difference between the proportion of public sector workers and 
private sector workers citing doing an important job as their primary work motivation. CPI (the 
Corruption Perception Index) is our measure of corruption. This widely-used measure captures 
the degree to which public officials and politicians are believed to accept bribes, take illicit 
payment in public procurement, embezzle public funds, and commit similar offences. Each 
country is given a score from 0 to 10 – we re-scale such that a higher number indicates a more 
corrupt administration. The index is based on 17 different polls and surveys, typically of business 
managers and experts (eg risk analysts and international organisations).  
X is a vector of controls including other differences in characteristics of public and private sector 
workers (average age, proportion female and education) and the size of the public sector 
(proxied by government spending as a share of GDP). We also control for the level of GDP; 
individuals in richer countries may be better able to prioritize an important job rather than a job 
with a good income (although focusing on the difference between motivations in the public and 
private sector should help to take care of the effect of the level of GDP) and there may be 
systematic differences in corruption across rich and poor countries. We also do a robustness 
check including government wages to confirm that the results are robust to levels of 
remuneration in the public sector, although this information is only available for a sub-sample of 
32 countries. 
Estimating this equation by OLS is likely to yield a biased estimate of the coefficient β1 because 
of the potential endogeneity of corruption. This includes not only the possible effect of pro-
sociality on corruption, but also the possibility that both the degree of corruption and pro-
sociality are jointly determined by some other factor, such as wages. We therefore instrument 
corruption using two variables suggested by the literature – latitude and uninterrupted years since 
becoming a democracy.  11 
 
A country’s latitude has consistently been used by previous studies to instrument for corruption 
(see for example Gupta et al, 2002, Cole, 2007). The instrument captures the extent of Western 
Europe’s influence around the world. Hall and Jones (1999) originally suggested latitude as an 
instrument for the quality of institutions. Their argument was that Western European explorers 
were more inclined to settle in counties which were both sparsely populated and had a 
comparable climate – and hence latitude – to Europe (including USA, Canada and Australia). 
Western Europeans tended to establish well-defined property rights and relatively good quality 
institutions, thus countries with greater latitude are generally associated with lower levels of 
corruption due to the positive Western European influence on a country’s social infrastructure. 
The second instrument is years of uninterrupted democracy (as used in Aidt et al., 2008). 
Treisman (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) argue that countries with a longer period of 
democratic rule have developed better processes in which to minimise corruption. The political 
system and the fear of losing the next election increase incentives to act fairly and in a non-
corrupt way. Lederman et al (2005) found that corruption is higher in countries that have a 
shorter or no democratic tradition. 
The results, reported in Table 4, suggest that these instruments are valid – the F-statistic from 
the first stage is greater than 10 and the p-value from the Sargan test shows that the null that the 
instruments are exogenous is not rejected. The IV results confirm that the level of corruption in 
the country has a negative effect on the level of intrinsic motivation among public sector 
workers. This is robust to including controls for GDP, government size and wages.  
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient indicates that a one point increase in the corruption 
perception index is associated with a three percentage point reduction in the degree of intrinsic 
motivation among workers in the public sector relative to those in the private sector. Within 
Europe, the gap between the most corrupt country (Italy) and the least corrupt country (Finland) 
is 4.7 points which would imply a 14 percentage point reduction in pro-social motivation. This is 12 
 
fairly similar to the observed difference in practice, which is 12 percentage points (a difference of 
+0.110 in Finland and a difference of -0.007 in Italy.)  
4.2. Worker selection 
As discussed above, one possible mechanism through which a negative relationship between 
corruption and the level of intrinsic motivation in the public sector may arise is if intrinsically-
motivated workers are less likely to choose to work in the public sector if the government is 
corrupt.  
To explore this, we estimate the following equation:  
ic c i c i c i ic u Z X CPI M CPI M Pub + + + + + + = δ γ β β β β 3 2 1 0  
As before, Pub is a binary indicator equal to one if the individual works in the public sector, but 
we now pool data from all countries and look at the effect of both individual characteristics 
(including intrinsic motivation) and country-level characteristics, including the level of 
corruption, instrumented as before. The coefficient on the interaction term, β3
The results are reported in Table 5 with standard errors clustered at the country-level. The 
coefficient β
, picks up whether 
the level of corruption has an effect on intrinsically motivated workers’ choice to work in the 
public sector.  
2 identifies the direct effect of corruption on whether or not someone chooses to 
work in the public sector for those who are not intrinsically motivated. This is positive in the 
specifications in columns (1) and (2) but insignificant once we control for the size of the 
government in column (3). As before, we find that intrinsically motivated workers are more likely 
to work in the public sector, and indeed the relationship is stronger when we include the 
interaction term with corruption.  We find that the coefficient on the interaction term, β3, is 
negative and significant, indicating that intrinsically motivated workers are less likely to work in 
the public sector when the government is more corrupt. Again comparing the most corrupt 13 
 
country in Europe with the least, our main results in column (3) indicate that someone who was 
intrinsically motivated (i.e. someone who wanted an important job) would be 4 percentage points 
less likely to work in the public sector in Italy than in Finland.  
Our main results control for the size of the public sector and the level of GDP. One possibility, 
however, is that the selection of intrinsically-motivated workers into the public sector may vary 
depending on the overall level of income in a country, and that to the extent that corruption is 
correlated with GDP, we are picking up this differential selection process. To test this, column 
(4) includes an additional interaction term between the level of GDP and an individual’s intrinsic 
motivation. The coefficient on this interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that 
motivated workers are less likely to choose to work in the public sector in richer countries. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction between corruption and an individual’s intrinsic 
motivation remains negative and statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. Finally, as a 
further robustness check, we run separate regressions on the richest and poorest 50 per cent of 
countries (results reported in columns (5) and (6)). In this case, the magnitude of the coefficients 
on the interaction term increases compared to the pooled regression, although it is not 
statistically significant in the sample of poor countries.   
5.  Conclusions 
This paper has presented new evidence on the extent of worker motivation in the public sector 
across a large sample of countries, showing that public sector workers tend to be more 
intrinsically motivated across a wide range of different countries. However, this is far from being 
a universal characteristic of public sector workers. The previous literature has emphasized the 
role of worker selection in explaining why there is a higher level of intrinsic motivation in the 
public sector. This implies that there are certain features of the public sector that can make it 14 
 
more attractive to pro-socially motivated workers; the evidence here suggests that such workers 
are less attracted to working in a corrupt administration. 15 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 





(CPI)     Obs 
Proportion 
Employed 




 in  Propn
NFP 
 in 
Andorra (AN)  881  0.95  0.78  0.21  0.01      
Argentina (AR)  740  0.49  0.72  0.26  0.02  0.16  7.1 
Australia (AU)  965  0.78  0.69  0.25  0.06  0.16  1.3 
Brazil (BR)  1,225  0.41  0.67  0.27  0.05     6.7 
Britain (GB)  725  0.66  0.71  0.25  0.04  0.2  1.4 
Bulgaria (BU)  706  0.60  0.71  0.29  0.00  0.29  6 
Burkina Faso (BF)  1,223  0.35  0.48  0.27  0.25     6.8 
Canada (CA)  1,503  0.68  0.69  0.28  0.03  0.19  1.5 
Chile (CH)  770  0.54  0.82  0.13  0.05  0.15  2.7 
China (CN)  1,705  0.24  0.57  0.42  0.01     6.7 
Cyprus (CY)  870  0.65  0.74  0.23  0.03  0.18  4.4 
Egypt (EG)  2,697  0.38  0.55  0.44  0.01     6.7 
Ethiopia (ET)  1,330  0.50  0.67  0.29  0.05     7.6 
Finland (FI)  724  0.66  0.57  0.41  0.03  0.27  0.4 
France (FR)  720  0.68  0.68  0.28  0.04  0.29  2.6 
Georgia (GE)  1,112  0.40  0.59  0.32  0.09  0.21  7.2 
Germany (DE)  1,306  0.62  0.56  0.22  0.21  0.15  2 
Ghana (GH)  1,278  0.64  0.83  0.12  0.05     6.7 
India (I)  1,736  0.45  0.39  0.17  0.44     6.7 
Indonesia (IN)  1,766  0.49  0.67  0.30  0.03     7.6 
Iran (IR)  2,268  0.43  0.64  0.31  0.04  0.19  7.3 
Italy (IT)  773  0.54  0.70  0.27  0.03  0.15  5.1 
Japan (JA)  796  0.71  0.82  0.15  0.03  0.08  2.4 
Malaysia (MY)  977  0.66  0.74  0.18  0.08  0.17  5 
Mali (MA)  1,197  0.32  0.34  0.26  0.40     7.2 
Mexico (ME)  1,289  0.50  0.68  0.23  0.08  0.12  6.7 
Moldova (MO)  821  0.62  0.56  0.43  0.01  0.27  6.8 
Morocco (MC)  1,066  0.90  0.89  0.10  0.01  0.1  6.8 
Netherlands (NE)  741  0.61  0.66  0.26  0.08     1.3 
Norway (NO)  778  0.85  0.62  0.38  0.01  0.35  1.2 
Peru (PE)  1,246  0.27  0.66  0.29  0.05     6.7 
Poland (PO)  730  0.58  0.61  0.38  0.01  0.27  6.3 
Romania (RO)  1,253  0.54  0.66  0.34  0.00  0.21  6.9 
Russia (RU)  1,513  0.72  0.55  0.40  0.06  0.33  7.5 
Rwanda (RW)  1,265  0.63  0.79  0.14  0.07     7.5 
South Africa (SA)  2,278  0.54  0.71  0.19  0.10     5.4 
South Korea (SK)  1,026  0.51  0.62  0.27  0.10     4.9 
Serbia (SE)  1,040  0.57  0.58  0.42  0.00     7 
Slovenia (SL)  762  0.63  0.63  0.35  0.02  0.29  3.6 
Spain (SP)  809  0.58  0.82  0.18  0.00  0.15  3.2 
Sweden (SV)  720  0.83  0.59  0.40  0.01  0.34  0.8 
Switzerland (SW)  797  0.83  0.65  0.31  0.04     0.9 
Taiwan (TA)  982  0.78  0.84  0.15  0.01     4.1 
Thailand (TH)  1,235  0.71  0.35  0.16  0.49  0.09  6.4 
Trinidad Tobago (TT)  763  0.62  0.68  0.30  0.01  0.27  6.8 
Turkey (TU)  1,167  0.40  0.81  0.18  0.01  0.14  6.2 
Ukraine (UK)  784  0.67  0.41  0.53  0.06  0.22  7.2 
Uruguay (UR)  668  0.50  0.80  0.18  0.01  0.16  3.6 
USA (US)  907  0.66  0.70  0.19  0.11  0.16  2.7 
Vietnam (VI)  1,199  0.25  0.36  0.61  0.03     7.4 
Zambia (ZA)  1,203  0.38  0.54  0.39  0.07     7.4 
Total  57,035  34,789  20,572  8,569  2,331       
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Table 2: Self-reported motivation among public/private sector workers 
Ordered in terms of the difference in the work motivation variable between the public and private sectors  
 
  Proportion who are intrinsically motivated, according to different indicators 
   (1) Work motivation  (2) Life motivation  (3) Active charity/env org. 
Country   Public  Private  Diff  Public  Private  Diff  Public  Private  Diff 
Britain  0.467  0.289  0.178  0.642  0.583  0.059  0.308  0.195  0.113 
Andorra  0.602  0.436  0.166  0.729  0.758  -0.029  0.192  0.156  0.036 
USA  0.384  0.226  0.158  0.509  0.530  -0.021  0.241  0.162  0.080 
Norway  0.583  0.447  0.136  0.719  0.700  0.019  0.149  0.086  0.062 
Canada  0.496  0.361  0.135  0.785  0.729  0.056  0.340  0.235  0.105 
Peru  0.423  0.298  0.125  0.663  0.631  0.033  0.265  0.133  0.133 
Turkey  0.313  0.194  0.119  0.663  0.560  0.102  0.036  0.026  0.010 
Finland  0.357  0.247  0.110  0.418  0.424  -0.006  0.128  0.055  0.072 
Germany  0.266  0.160  0.106  0.540  0.385  0.155  0.078  0.044  0.035 
Sweden  0.544  0.441  0.104  0.755  0.708  0.048  0.109  0.066  0.043 
Chile  0.222  0.129  0.093  0.698  0.651  0.047  0.204  0.091  0.113 
China  0.230  0.145  0.086  0.676  0.601  0.075  0.143  0.064  0.079 
Argentina  0.260  0.177  0.083  0.745  0.641  0.104  0.094  0.065  0.029 
Iran  0.375  0.292  0.083  0.582  0.562  0.020  0.180  0.130  0.050 
Vietnam  0.133  0.075  0.058  0.425  0.453  -0.027  0.202  0.150  0.053 
Ethiopia  0.096  0.050  0.046  0.463  0.346  0.117  0.234  0.134  0.100 
Indonesia  0.213  0.169  0.044  0.717  0.590  0.126  0.322  0.253  0.068 
Thailand  0.124  0.082  0.042  0.316  0.276  0.040  0.161  0.160  0.001 
Serbia  0.161  0.120  0.041  0.541  0.489  0.052  0.156  0.101  0.054 
Australia  0.355  0.315  0.040  0.516  0.462  0.054  0.160  0.127  0.033 
Japan  0.293  0.253  0.040  0.185  0.192  -0.006  0.012  0.009  0.003 
Rwanda  0.202  0.162  0.040  0.574  0.541  0.033  0.284  0.154  0.131 
Uruguay  0.136  0.099  0.036  0.754  0.562  0.192  0.115  0.048  0.066 
Ukraine  0.158  0.126  0.032  0.585  0.522  0.063  0.043  0.014  0.029 
Mexico  0.336  0.306  0.029  0.711  0.687  0.024  0.233  0.128  0.105 
Burkina Faso  0.088  0.059  0.029  0.598  0.604  -0.006  0.070  0.063  0.007 
Georgia  0.160  0.137  0.023  0.653  0.675  -0.022  0.007  0.000  0.007 
Romania  0.101  0.078  0.022  0.687  0.555  0.132  0.028  0.005  0.023 
Taiwan  0.214  0.193  0.021  0.652  0.610  0.042  0.107  0.071  0.036 
India  0.101  0.081  0.020  0.496  0.513  -0.016  0.323  0.184  0.139 
France  0.279  0.261  0.018  0.584  0.553  0.031  0.161  0.117  0.043 
Morocco  0.134  0.119  0.015  0.515  0.434  0.082  0.071  0.021  0.050 
Poland  0.184  0.169  0.015  0.669  0.547  0.122  0.061  0.034  0.027 
Ghana  0.101  0.086  0.015  0.636  0.580  0.057  0.333  0.127  0.206 
Cyprus  0.162  0.149  0.013  0.838  0.763  0.075  0.131  0.061  0.069 
Malaysia  0.111  0.100  0.011  0.293  0.288  0.005  0.147  0.048  0.099 
Netherlands  0.328  0.317  0.010  0.708  0.595  0.114  0.108  0.074  0.035 
Brazil  0.283  0.273  0.010  0.790  0.828  -0.039  0.232  0.142  0.090 
Russia  0.122  0.115  0.007  0.402  0.366  0.036  0.009  0.023  -0.014 
Egypt  0.095  0.090  0.005  0.709  0.649  0.060  0.047  0.016  0.031 
Zambia  0.149  0.145  0.003  0.540  0.544  -0.004  0.173  0.135  0.038 
Switzerland  0.524  0.521  0.003  0.602  0.585  0.017  0.155  0.142  0.014 
Trinidad and 
 
0.343  0.340  0.003  0.708  0.691  0.017  0.215  0.169  0.046 
Italy  0.313  0.319  -0.007        0.123  0.072  0.050 
Moldova  0.115  0.122  -0.007  0.488  0.449  0.040  0.074  0.045  0.028 
Slovenia  0.117  0.125  -0.008  0.186  0.180  0.006  0.055  0.024  0.031 
South Africa  0.078  0.089  -0.012  0.324  0.278  0.046  0.016  0.012  0.005 
Spain  0.138  0.153  -0.015  0.632  0.647  -0.015  0.115  0.049  0.066 
Bulgaria  0.092  0.110  -0.018  0.517  0.470  0.047  0.033  0.013  0.020 
South Korea  0.261  0.297  -0.036  0.646  0.601  0.046  0.120  0.102  0.019 





Table 3: Country-level regression coefficients (bold denotes significant at 10% level) 
Dependent variable = individual works in the public sector (0/1) 
Country   Age  Female  Degree 







 Active in 
sports 
Andorra  -0.002  0.060  0.234  0.070  -0.017  0.042  0.050 
Argentina  0.011  0.083  0.063  0.080  0.071  0.039  -0.093 
Australia  0.005  0.185  0.154  -0.018  0.018  0.012  0.034 
Brazil  0.005  0.195  0.244  -0.003  -0.061  0.064  0.116 
Britain  0.003  0.180  0.154  0.099  0.033  0.082  0.013 
Bulgaria  0.009  0.101  0.220  -0.059  0.002  0.104  -0.237 
Burkina Faso  -0.004  0.091  0.473  0.069  -0.026  0.013  0.282 
Canada  0.003  0.118  0.193  0.075  0.055  0.073  0.020 
Chile  0.000  0.073  0.108  0.063  0.012  0.107  -0.027 
China  0.012  0.007  0.331  0.115  0.039  0.150  0.184 
Cyprus  0.002  -0.030  0.189  -0.024  0.058  0.137  -0.008 
Egypt  0.011  0.307  0.173  -0.026  0.073  0.223  0.004 
Ethiopia  -0.006  0.126  0.321  0.083  0.085  0.101  0.102 
Finland  0.006  0.282  0.250  0.039  -0.013  0.119  0.041 
France  0.006  0.050  0.277  -0.049  0.027  0.062  0.060 
Georgia  0.000  0.282  0.225  0.043  -0.045  0.350  0.752 
Germany  -0.001  0.152  0.289  0.055  0.087  0.064  0.069 
Ghana  0.001  -0.036  0.457  -0.011  0.021  0.129  0.071 
India  0.006  0.141  0.394  0.004  -0.091  0.080  0.119 
Indonesia  0.012  0.069  0.326  0.011  0.084  0.040  0.056 
Iran  0.005  0.086  0.381  0.016  0.035  0.076  0.063 
Italy  0.008  0.165  0.212  -0.022    0.100  -0.059 
Japan  0.001  0.050  0.104  0.021  -0.008  0.091  0.052 
Malaysia  0.006  0.042  0.161  -0.014  -0.001  0.219  0.085 
Mali  0.004  0.219  0.338  -0.196  0.085  0.097  0.146 
Mexico  0.003  0.156  0.270  -0.009  -0.022  0.116  0.074 
Moldova  0.007  0.252  0.000  -0.053  -0.014  0.087  0.011 
Morocco  0.000  -0.022  0.272  -0.002  0.029  0.147  0.049 
Netherlands  0.002  0.083  -0.088  0.016  0.081  0.076  -0.011 
Norway  0.005  0.263  0.223  0.046  0.019  0.057  -0.056 
Peru  0.009  0.008  0.240  0.074  -0.012  0.124  0.135 
Poland  0.004  0.073  0.102  0.008  0.113  0.177  0.214 
Romania  0.008  0.064  0.230  -0.016  0.035  -0.225  -0.036 
Russia  0.008  0.125  0.095  0.042  0.094  0.311  -0.056 
Rwanda  -0.002  0.001  0.704  0.033  0.005  0.096  0.090 
Serbia  0.001  0.038  0.225  0.041  0.024  0.057  -0.042 
Slovenia  0.004  0.056  0.176  -0.044  -0.022  0.225  -0.012 
South Africa  0.006  0.065  0.196  -0.071  0.037  0.029  0.113 
South Korea  0.007  0.123  0.251  -0.076  0.027  0.044  -0.010 
Spain  0.006  0.000  0.274  -0.020  -0.017  0.141  -0.028 
Sweden  0.004  0.305  0.096  0.034  -0.003  0.087  -0.061 
Switzerland  0.003  0.173  0.158  -0.022  -0.016  -0.002  0.014 
Taiwan  0.004  0.018  0.190  -0.020  0.014  0.017  0.041 
Thailand  0.004  -0.131  0.378  0.037  0.030  0.011  0.031 
Trinidad and 
 
0.006  -0.056  0.333  -0.003  0.003  0.022  0.136 
Turkey  0.003  0.064  0.249  0.085  0.066  -0.009  0.026 
Ukraine  0.007  0.071  0.022  0.074  0.049  0.209  0.070 
Uruguay  0.003  -0.083  0.257  0.015  0.113  0.130  -0.013 
USA  0.002  0.056  0.095  0.129  -0.024  0.080  -0.038 
Vietnam  0.003  -0.051  0.161  0.100  -0.027  0.087  -0.021 
Zambia  0.001  0.105  0.216  0.005  -0.026  0.054  -0.012 
# +ive coeffs (sig)  44 (31)  44 (28)  49 (45)  30 (6)  33 (10)  48 (18)  33 (17) 
# -ive coeffs (sig)  7 (3)  7 (2)  1 (0)  21 (1)  18 (1)  3 (1)  18 (0) 21 
 
Table 4: Corruption and the level of intrinsic motivation in the public sector 
 
Dependent variable = Level of intrinsic motivation in the public sector (relative to private sector) 
  OLS  TSLS 














  -0.0126** 
(0.0036) 














































GDP_rel_US    0.0000 
(0.0006) 






Govt_share    -0.0014 
(0.0013) 






Latitude      -2.3869** 
(1.0816) 
  -1.3479 
(0.9846) 
   
Yrs’ democracy      -0.0744** 
(0.0075) 
  -0.0422** 
(0.0097) 
   
Gov wages              -0.0172** 
(0.0071) 
F-stat      77.03    10.99     
Sargan (p-value)        0.6202    0.8891   
N  49  49  49  49  49  49  32 
Notes to table: 
Regressions exclude Serbia, Andorra and Columbia because of missing variables 
** denotes coefficient is significant at 5%, * at 10% level 
CPI = corruption perception index. 0 – 10 where 10 is most corrupt. Year: 2006. (Source: Transparency International,) 
Diff refers to difference in mean characteristics between the public and private sectors 
GDP_rel_US = GDP relative to US, US = 100. Year: 2006. (Source: Penn World Tables) 
Govt Share = Government share of total output . Year: 2006. (Source: Penn World Tables) 
Latitude = absolute latitude, re-scaled from 0 to 1 (Source: Central Intelligence Agency) 
Years’ democracy = number of years since country became a democracy. Year: 2006. (Source: Database of Political 
Institutions)  
Gov wages = Government wages, relative to manufacturing. Year: 1995. (Source: World Bank) 
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Table 5: Corruption and selection into the public sector, IV regression results 
 
Dependent variable = individual works in the public sector (0/1) 




   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
CPI  0.0082  0.0111**  -0.0030  0.0280  -0.0017  0.0367 
(0.0051)  (0.0055)  (0.0183)  (0.0202)  (0.0123)  (0.0333) 
Intrinsically motivated  0.0218**  0.0670**  0.0677**  0.0498**  0.0709**  0.1368 
(0.0091)  (0.0217)  (0.0207)  (0.0180)  (0.0154)  (0.0901) 
Intrinsically motivated * CPI    -0.0101**  -0.0091**  -0.0057*  -0.0122**  -0.0199 
  (0.0041)  (0.0041)  (0.0034)  (0.0039)  (0.0140) 
Intrinsically motivated * GDP        -0.0004*     
      (0.0002)     
Age  0.0046**  0.0046**  0.0047**  0.0047**  0.0045**  0.0049** 
(0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0006)  (0.0013) 
Degree  0.2240**  0.2236**  0.2259**  0.2284**  0.1708**  0.2969** 
(0.0180)  (0.0018)  (0.0168)  (0.0162)  (0.0132)  (0.0218) 
Female  0.0927**  0.0920**  0.0931**  0.0934**  0.1105**  0.0727* 
(0.0160)  (0.0159)  (0.0164)  (0.0166)  (0.0190)  (0.0268) 
GDP_rel_US        -0.0012  0.0013  -0.0002  -0.0008 
(0.0016)  (0.0015)  (0.0013)  (0.0029) 
Govt_share        0.0019  0.0017  0.0142**  -0.0004 
(0.0026)  (0.0026)  (0.0048)  (0.0025) 
N  27451  27451  27451  27451  13734  13717 
Notes to table: 
Regressions exclude data from Serbia, Andorra and Columbia because of missing variables 
** denotes coefficient is significant at 5%. Standard errors are clustered at the country level 
CPI = corruption perception index. 0 – 10 where 10 is most corrupt. Year: 2006. (Source: Transparency International) 
GDP_rel_US = GDP relative to US, US = 100. Year: 2006. (Source: Penn World Tables) 








Line indicates best fit from a linear regression 




Figure 2: Intrinsic motivation and Corruption 
 
   
Notes: 
Line indicates best fit from a linear regression 
See Table 1 for details of country names  